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OVERVIEW
We investigate the reasons behind the occurrence of accounting fraud despite the
enactment of internal control regulation both in the U.S. and in Japan. Using a case study
approach to identify the causes of accounting fraud, we present a preventive solution for
managers. Chief financial officers（CFOs）of firms bear the responsibility of pointing out
problems they detect through the exclusive information they are privy to regarding the
firm. Ultimately, CFOs need to make a difficult decision to avoid losses as a manager. To
this end, CFOs have two options: to commit aggressive earnings management or to launch
layoffs. In the event a firm makes losses, the CFO is responsible for counteractions such as
layoffs and business restructuring. Generally accepted accounting principles allow managers
to manage earnings; however, accounting numbers sometimes depend on CFOs’discretion.
Therefore, CFOs opt for earnings management as a pre-emptive measure to losses and re-
lated consequences, and aggressive earnings management is found to be a major cause of
accounting fraud.
１. Introduction
In Japan during the１９７０s, finance and accounting were unpopular subjects among
students and the younger generations. Images of accountants and treasurers tended to por-
tray monotonous, rigid people. Accountants were characterized as financial watchdogs with
no sense of humor or flexibility, perpetually conceptualizing the worst-case scenarios. How-
４９
／■修校了／１２－２８５／本文／ＡＺ２８５Ｃ 2018.02.28 14.55.37 Page 41
ever, from the １９９０s, these perceptions changed completely as shareholders matured and
the position of accounting manager（Keiri-Bucho in Japanese）changed to chief financial offi-
cer（CFO）, whose role is to act as a supporter and adviser to the chief executive officer
（CEO）. This elevation in corporate status of CFOs is the result of shareholder value man-
agement, which began in the early１９９０s in Japan.
Why did Japanese management shift to shareholder value management？ The first
reason was the decline in corporate performance during the １９９０s, which led firms to seek
improvement in their financial situation in response to pressure from financial markets. The
second reason was the impact of sluggish share prices in the １９９０s, which left emerging in-
stitutional investors dissatisfied. The third reason was that institutional investors in pension
funds and trust funds developed their influence in capital markets. Consequently, share-
holder value management became the dominant management style among Japanese firms.
Shareholder value management places more importance on the interests of the
shareholders’over those of other stakeholders, such as customers, managers, employees, so-
cieties and other interested parties. This management style aims to maximize shareholder
value. According to financial theory, firms can achieve this by raising its share price or in-
creasing free cash flow. However, it is quite difficult for a firm to raise the share price since
this is determined by capital markets. Moreover, no market exists for shares in private and
unlisted firms. Therefore, maximizing free cash flow has become the most important focus
for firms. Shareholder value is calculated by the present value of future cash flows. If a firm
increases its free cash flow, then it may also increase shareholder value. Of course, the most
important source of free cash flow is profit.
Generally, firm earnings improve by increasing revenues and／or decreasing ex-
penses. However, earnings are also improved by various accounting practices, such as inven-
tory valuation adjustment, various kinds of allowances or provisions, deferred tax account-
ing, market value accounting, and tax avoidance schemes. CFOs usually manage all these ac-
counting practices, which raises their status within the firm. This also means that only the
CFO can improve the firm’s cash flow. This elevated status of CFOs under shareholder
value management began in the U.S. in the early １９８０s and spread to Japan in the １９９０s.
Since then, CFOs have become deeply involved in the decision-making process, with a focus
on cash flow, shareholder gain, and short-term earnings.
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２. Enron Fraud Orchestrated by the CFO
A classic example of fraudulent accounting practices under shareholder value man-
agement was the scandal surrounding American energy company Enron. As CFO, Andrew
Fastow was a key financial strategist for the firm. He earned his MBA at Northwestern Uni-
versity and worked for Continental Illinois National Bank and Trust Company in Chicago.
He was appointed to his position by Enron’s CEO, Jeffrey Skilling. Importantly, Fastow set
up many special purpose entities（SPEs）for Enron’s various business operations.
Fastow made full use of a range of financial strategies beginning with the strategy
of a mark-to-market（MTM）accounting system. When long-term supply contracts were
agreed, revenues were reported at present value. From the viewpoint of Japanese and inter-
national accounting rules, this was an illegal procedure. However, under the U.S. accounting
rule at that time, it was legal, and other large energy and power industries also adopted
these accounting procedures. The second strategy was adopting typical cash flow maximiza-
tion by reducing bank debt to raise the firm’s rating. The third strategy was the asset-light
strategy, which created greater liquidity in assets. To achieve the asset-light strategy, the
CFO established various SPE arrangements that were invested by Enron shares. Therefore,
the strategy was dependent on the rise in Enron’s share price.
Financial markets required Enron’s top management to report quarterly results to
raise the share price. Over the course of the１９８０s and１９９０s, various factors influenced this
focus on quarterly results. Because of the４０１（k）retirement plan, more Americans expected
quarterly earnings. Therefore, more firms gave their executives stock options. Financial
markets also expected growth in earnings.
The Enron scandal erupted essentially because of the company’s ambitious and un-
compromising strategies:“Enron’s corporate culture was essentially focused on two things:
the first was profits and the second was how to make even greater profit. The firm didn’t
strive to create long-lasting business relationships and had little desire to be involved in any-
thing that smacked of the low-margins associated with retail-oriented business.”１
１ Peter C. Fusaro & Ross M. Miller.（２００２）. What Went Wrong at ENRON, WILEY, pp.４７
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３. Internal Control is Not Effective in Preventing Corporate Fraud
After the Enron and WorldCom scandals, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act（SOX）―enacted
by the U.S. Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection Act of ２００２―
imposed new rules on corporate executives, including CEOs and CFOs.
In Japan, SEIBU railway was accused of material misstatement in their annual re-
port for October ２００４, while accounting fraud at KANEBO was revealed in ２００５. Following
these exposures, the Financial Instruments and Exchange Act in ２００６ legislated the imple-
mentation of internal control systems. Listed firms in Japan were subject to the Act from
FY２００８. However, the Act has not been effective in preventing corporate fraud, and many
scandals have continued to be revealed in the U.S. and Japan. In ２００３, FreddieMac, a major
mortgage firm, misstated $５ billion in earnings. American International Group was accused
of a massive accounting fraud totaling $３．９ billion, along with bid-rigging and stock-price
manipulation. Lehman Brothers disguised $５０ billion in loans as sales. Under this situation,
the U.S. Securities Exchange Commission（SEC）is now strengthening the SOX and finan-
cial regulations especially to prevent financial fraud.
In Japan, Olympus was involved in accounting fraud that involved covering up $６８７
million in losses. In addition, Daio Paper gave $１００million in illegal loans to one of its found-
ing families. In ２０１５, Toshiba’s accounting scandals were revealed by a whistleblower: the
company’s combined operating profit for the five-year period ending in March ２０１４ was
likely inflated by over ￥１５０billion.
４. Earnings Management May Lead to Accounting Fraud
Accounting fraud is an old problem, which sometimes makes it difficult to ascertain
whether a particular accounting practice is legal or illegal.“Earnings management within
Generally Accepted Accounting Principle（GAAP）allows managers to use a variety of ac-
counting techniques to produce financial reports that may paint an overly positive picture of
a firm’s business activities and financial position. Earnings management takes advantage of
how accounting standards can be applied and are legitimately flexible when firms can incur
expenses and recognize revenue. It can be difficult for outside users to differentiate these
sanctioned practices from earnings manipulation. Although managers are allowed to practice
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earnings management within GAAP theoretically, this is often leads to manipulation or earn-
ings fraud.”２
A firm can change its on-paper profitability using an earnings management. If a
firm makes a huge loss, then it may face various problems. A firm always experiences pres-
sure from financial markets. Many shareholders may intend to sell their shares to avoid the
capital loss, and, as a result, the main shareholders may require structural reforms, including
layoffs, mergers, and acquisitions. Banks may stop financing the firm. Suppliers may not sell
their merchandises or materials to the firm on credit because of the risk of its insolvency.
Customers may not buy the products of the firm given the risk of service loss. Therefore,
CFOs are obliged to show a profit to the full legal extent. Once a firm makes a loss, the
management has to take actions, such as layoffs and business restructuring. These are very
tough decisions, which is why CFOs opt for earnings management.
Essentially, there are many ambiguities in accounting regarding the recognition of
revenues and expenses, and it is difficult to differentiate earnings management from earn-
ings fraud or manipulation. Therefore, the CFO has the ultimate responsibility of showing a
profit―this is the firm’s primary concern and a natural part of management behavior. To
report a loss would be unacceptable since it would require countermeasures from stakehold-
ers, such as shareholders, banks, suppliers, and the parent company. The firm’s manage-
ment has to prepare and explain the reported losses and their restructuring plan to the
stakeholders and then implement that plan.
The CFO has to analyze the causes behind the loss and explain them to the stake-
holders. If a firm reports a loss, then banks are reluctant to lend money; thus, in the worst-
case scenario, it will face a shortage of working capital and go bankrupt. Therefore, CFOs
make every endeavor to fulfill banks’and other stakeholders’requests as quickly as possi-
ble.
The CFO not only describes the difficult conditions faced by the firm but also pre-
sents plans for a profitable operation with new products and businesses. The development
of new products requires new human resources, whereas employees in the unprofitable
business are reduced. The management executes layoffs and structural reforms and, at the
same time, hires new employees and invests in new businesses. This is a demanding job, but
２ INVESTOPEDIA: http: ／／www.investopedia.com／terms／e／earnings-management.asp
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the CFO is responsible for devising solutions.
There are alternatives, such as waiting for a market recovery or introducing new
profitable products before executing layoffs and implementing structural reforms. Although
nobody wants to close factories and sales offices or cut jobs, it is unacceptable for the man-
agement to be making a loss. If the firm makes even a small profit or breaks even, then it is
not necessary to execute layoffs and structural reforms unless an unexpected crisis occurs,
such as the Lehman Brothers’collapse.
The CFO is often the key to the firm’s performance. The CFO must question
whether the financial report is prepared in accordance with GAAP, i.e., the report must be
accurate, reasonable, audited, and complete. This is a very difficult question and a headache
for CFOs because there are many accounting procedures and rules, business practices, and
risks between countries that need to be considered. Especially, there are huge differences in
provisions or allowances, calculation methods for depreciation, and evaluation methods for
inventories or securities; as a result, these estimations significantly impact the earnings
statement. If the CFO decides that the operations have low or no risk, then the firm may re-
duce the provision or allowance as much as possible and, as a result, turn a loss-bearing firm
into profit-generating one; thus, the difference between profitable and unprofitable firms
rests in the opinions and perspectives of the CFO. If the CFO considers that a profit can be
shown using earnings management, then they may wait for a year or more; in this way, the
loss is postponed in the expectation of realizing future profits.
５. Case Study
５.１ Example of a Trading Company
In １９９０, a trading company accumulated huge inventories due to decreasing sales,
which would normally be written down. If the CFO were to write down the inventories,
then the firm would report a huge loss for that fiscal year. If the CFO were to report this
loss, then banks would be reluctant to finance to the firm. The CFO of the trading company
decided not to write down the inventories and postponed the loss. He explained to the audi-
tors that the industrial products market would recover and register sufficient growth and
that it was possible to sell out all inventories at the same price, thereby eliminating the need
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to write down the stock.
Unfortunately, the industrial market did not recover in １９９１, and the firm would
definitely make a huge loss that year if it disposed of inventories at discounted prices. If the
CFO were to write down the inventories, report a loss in the previous year, and, as a result,
submit to restructuring, then the firm would be able to avoid the loss in１９９１. However, the
CFO repeated their previous strategy, i.e., he opted for the“double down”strategy. In the
second half of １９９１, the new automotive parts business that the firm had been developing
for a long time began to expand rapidly, which covered the loss of the industrial products
and generated a profit in１９９１.
The industrial market recovered in１９９２, and the firm successfully wrestled market
share from competitors that had reduced their sales force and channels by restructuring in
１９９０ when the trading company had preserved theirs. As things turned out, the CFO’s
strategy to not report a loss and execute restructuring in １９９０ proved to be an astute one.
This is a good example of a CFO not reporting a loss to continue the business successfully.
５.２ Example of a Consumer Product Manufacturing Company
Once a firm makes a loss, the management establishes reserves for a loss on busi-
ness restructuring and reports a huge loss in the current term to overcome difficult legacies
from the past. Using the restructuring reserves, the management develops a new business
and sells out the unprofitable operations and non-performing assets. These procedures are
common in practice. The CFO estimates the restructuring cost and records the reserves as
much as possible. The restructuring reserves include the accrued expenses to cover future
costs of layoffs or of closing down a section of a business or a plant.
In １９９５, a consumer product manufacturing company announced a restructuring
plan to reduce its unprofitable consumer products and expand its new business in computer
peripherals. The sales offices were integrated or partly closed. As a result, the number of
sales offices decreased from ten to６, and the firm reduced its workforce by５０percent.
The firm explained the structural reforms as innovative transformation from an un-
profitable consumer electronics business to a new, profitable computer business. Finally, the
firm laid off more than １，０００ employees and incurred expenses of $１２０ million over two
years.
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However, although the firm reduced employee numbers and unprofitable products
and expended a considerable amount of money, it reported a loss in１９９６due to delays in its
new product development. The CFO could not report a loss in１９９６because he had already
expended $６０million the previous year and promised to recover the loss. He decided to use
the remaining restructuring reserves（$６０ million）to compensate the loss and did not re-
port the loss in１９９６. This meant that he would postpone restructuring for the next year but
would have no reserve capital. However, he avoided reporting a loss in１９９６and maintained
employment and a sales force.
In１９９７, the new computer peripherals business could not generate a profit because
of market-price decline. The CFO was distressed by the drop in the firm’s performance. He
had already used the restructuring reserves for generating a profit in １９９６, and he had no
reserves for the structural reform. However, if the firm reported a loss again in １９９７, then
banks would stop financing and the firm would run short of money.
The CFO sought a simple solution to generate a profit and avoid a loss in １９９７ us-
ing various accounting techniques. The firm could adjust its financial statements by over-
stating its revenues or assets, postponing expenses, and under-recording liabilities. If the
firm could implement its new products, then it would make a profit and these adjustments
and postponement would be corrected by the profitable operation. Thus, the CFO reported
a profit in１９９７at the expense of the next year’s income.
However, the results were devastating. In １９９８, the sales of the new products re-
mained stagnant and the firm reported a huge loss. The CFO had no countermeasures to
the difficult situation. Although he had made efforts to maintain the business, he was criti-
cized for accounting fraud and he lost his position as CFO.
６. Conclusion
Given their knowledge of firm finances, CFOs are responsible for pointing out prof-
itability problems to the management. Only the CFO can control an aggressive and positive
CEO; however, the CFO must make difficult decisions on whether to utilize earnings man-
agement and commit accounting fraud or to launch layoffs and restructuring. Accounting is
not a rigid or absolute practice; in the case of CFOs, firm profit and loss are at the discretion
of their decision making and underlying rationale. Firms that commit accounting fraud go
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bankrupt and are relegated in the capitalist economy hierarchy. The prevention of account-
ing fraud depends on the conscientiousness and sense of duty of the CFO and the CEO.
This situation also signals the limitations of corporate governance.
However, to help prevent accounting fraud, regulators, auditors, and the manage-
ment should consider the following two countermeasures.
First, the stock exchanges should directly hire and pay auditors.
“Essentially, the responsibility for hiring and paying auditors needs to be moved
from company managers to the stock exchanges. . . . . As a result, stock exchanges would
have a strong incentive to ensure that listed companies provide high quality information to
investors - which is precisely why they require listed companies to prepare audited financial
reports. . . . . . The stock exchanges could cover the audit fees and their oversight expenses.
. . . In２００２, audit fees for NYSE firms totaled roughly $７billion. . . . the total trading volume
on the exchange was３６０billion shares, or $１０trillion. That means the audit fees could have
been funded by an incremental trading fee paid to the stock exchange of less than two
cents per share traded, or through a０．０７percent fee on the dollar value of shares traded.３”
Second, the CEO should focus on long-term management and refrain from disclos-
ing short-term results and／or forecasts.
Maximizing profits is the most important goal for a firm. When a CFO discloses the
firm’s short-term results and／or forecast, this influences its share price and rating. There-
fore, to maximize short-term earnings, CFOs tend to increase quarterly results using a le-
gally permitted financial technique called“earnings management.”However, earnings man-
agement may lead to accounting fraud. To avoid accounting fraud, a firm should focus on
long-term management. Only a long-term and forward-looking management style will allow
CFOs to prepare accurate and transparent financial statements.
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